Appian: In this unexpected manner did Cornificius, and those of his army who managed to get away, escape to Agrippa at Mylae. Agrippa, however, had just taken Tyndaris, a stronghold full of provisions and admirably situated for naval warfare. Thither Octavian transported his infantry and cavalry. He had in Sicily altogether twenty-one legions of infantry, 20,000 cavalry, and more than 5000 light-armed troops. The garrison of Pompeius still held Mylae, and all places from Mylae to Naulochi and Pelorus, and all the coast. These garrisons, in fear of Agrippa, kept fires burning continually, signifying that they would set fire to any ships that should sail against them. Pompeius was also master of the defiles on both sides of the island. The mountain passes in the neighbourhood of Tauromenium and around Mylae were fortified by him, and he harassed Octavian when the latter was making a forward movement from Tyndaris, but not coming to an engagement. Believing that Agrippa was moving his fleet against him, Pompeius changed his position to Pelorus, abandoning the defiles around Mylae; and Octavian occupied them and also Mylae and Artemisium, a very small town, in which, they say, were the cattle of the Sun and where Ulysses fell asleep. When the report of Agrippa's movement turned out to be false, Pompeius was troubled that he had lost the defiles, and he called to his assistance Tisienus, with his army. Octavian thought to intercept Tisienus, but lost his way around Mount Myconium. He passed the night there without tents. There was a heavy rainfall, as often occurs in the autumn, and some of his armour-bearers held a Gallic shield over his head the whole night. Harsh mutterings and prolonged roars from Mount Etna were heard, accompanied by flames which lighted up the camp, so that the Germans sprang from their beds in fear. Others, who had heard what had been related of Mount Etna, would not have been surprised, in presence of these remarkable phenomena, if even the torrent of fire had rolled upon them. After this Octavian ravaged the territory of the Palaestenians, where Lepidus, who was foraging, met him, and they both encamped near Messana. As there had been many skirmishes throughout Sicily, but no general engagement, Octavian sent Taurus to cut off Pompeius' supplies by first capturing the towns that furnished them. Pompeius was so much inconvenienced by this that he decided to stake everything on a great battle. Since he feared the enemy's infantry, but had confidence in his own ships, he sent and asked Octavian if he would allow the war to be decided by a naval engagement. Octavian, although he dreaded all naval encounters, which until now had turned out badly for him, considered it base to refuse, and, accordingly, accepted the challenge. A day was fixed by them, for which 300 ships were put in readiness on either side, provided with missiles of all kinds, with towers and whatever machines they could think of. Agrippa devised one called the "grip," a piece of wood •five cubits long bound with iron and having rings at the extremities. To one of these rings was attached the grip itself, an iron claw, to the other numerous ropes, which drew it by machine power after it had been thrown by a catapult and had seized the enemy's ships. When the appointed day came the rival shouts of the oarsmen were first heard, accompanied by missiles thrown by machines and by hand, such as stones, firebrands, and arrows. Then the ships dashed p575 against each other, some striking amidships, others on the prows, others on the beaks, where the blows are most effectual in discomposing the combatants and rendering the vessel useless. Others broke the opposing line by sailing through it, at the same time discharging arrows and javelins; and the small boats picked up those who fell overboard. There was a struggle of soldiers while the sailors put forth their strength and the pilots their skill and their lung-power; the generals cheered their men, and all the machines were brought into requisition. The "grip" achieved the greatest success. Thrown from a long distance upon the ships, as it could be by reason of its lightness, it clutched them, as soon as the ropes pulled on it from behind. On account of the iron bands it could not be easily cut by the men whom it attacked, and those who tried to cut the ropes were prevented from reaching them by its length. As this apparatus had never been known before, the enemy had not provided themselves with scythe-mounted poles. One thing seemed advisable in this unexpected emergency, and that was, to back water and draw the ship away; but as the enemy did the same the force exerted by the men was equal on both sides, and the grip did its work. Accordingly, when the ships were drawn together, there was every kind of fighting, the men leaping upon each other's decks. It was no longer easy to distinguish an enemy from a friend, as they used the same weapons for the most part, and nearly all spoke the Latin tongue, and the watchwords of each side were divulged to the other while they were mingled together. Hence arose many and divers frauds and lack of confidence on both sides on the part of those using the same watchword. They failed to recognize each other, what with the fighting and the sea, now a confused medley of corpses, clashing arms, and crashing ships; for they left nothing untried except fire. This they abstained from, after their first onset, because they were locked together. The foot-soldiers of each army on the land beheld this sea-fight with apprehension and eagerness, believing that their own hope of safety was bound up in it. They could not distinguish anything, however sharply they might look, but merely a long-drawn‑out line of 600 ships, and an alternation of cries and groans now on one side and now on the other. Judging from the colours of the towers, which constituted the only difference between them, Agrippa with difficulty made out that Pompeius' ships had sustained the greater loss, and he cheered on those who were close to him as though they were already victors. Then he drove at the enemy and pressed upon them without ceasing, until he overpowered those nearest him. They then lowered their towers and turned their ships in flight toward the straits. Seventeen of them, which were in advance, made their escape thither. The rest were cut off by Agrippa and some were pursued and driven aground. The pursuers ran aground with them in the rush, and either pulled off those that had come to a standstill or set fire to them. When the Pompeian ships that were still fighting saw what had befallen these, they surrendered to their enemies. Then the soldiers of Octavian who were in the ships raised a shout of victory and those on land gave an answering shout. Those of Pompeius groaned. Pompeius himself, darting away from Naulochi, hastened to Messana, giving not even orders to his infantry in his panic. Accordingly Octavian received the surrender of these also at the hands of Tisienus on terms agreed upon, and of the cavalry besides, who were surrendered by their officers. Three of Octavian's ships were sunk in the fight. Pompeius lost twenty-eight in this way, and the remainder were burned, or captured, or run aground and stove in pieces, except the seventeen that escaped. Pompeius learned of the defection of his infantry while on the road, and changed his costume from that of a commander to that of a private citizen, and sent orders to Messana to put on shipboard everything possible. All preparations to this end had been made long before. He summoned Plenius from Lilybaeum in haste, with the eight legions he had, intending to take flight with them. Plenius hastened to comply with this order, but as other friends, garrisons, and soldiers were deserting, and the enemy's fleet was moving into the straits, Pompeius did not wait even for Plenius in his well-fortified city, but fled, with his seventeen ships, from Messana to Antony, remembering that he had saved his mother in similar circumstances. After his departure Plenius arrived at Messana and occupied the place. Octavian himself remained in the camp at Naulochi, but he ordered Agrippa to lay siege to Messana, which the latter did, in conjunction with Lepidus. Plenius sent envoys to treat for peace. Agrippa wanted to wait till morning for the arrival of Octavian, but Lepidus granted terms, and in order to conciliate the soldiers of Plenius to himself allowed them to join the rest of the army in plundering the city.
See:
- Appian: The Civil Wars. Book 5, paragraph 116–122